Real Wages and Unemployment in the OECD Countries AN ACTIVE DEBATE iS now under way in the United States, Europe, and Japan about the scope for expansionary macroeconomic policies in the near term. Although unemployment is at postwar historical highs in Europe and the United States and inflation has receded rapidly in the major economies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, there is remarkable reticence in advocating expansionary policies among the governments of OECD countries. One school of thought holds that much of the unemployment problem in Europe, and to a lesser extent in the United States and Japan, results from real wages at inappropriate levels and thus the problem cannot be ameliorated by adjusting demand-management policies. The West German Minister of Economics strongly enunciated this view. ' Nevertheless, our economies are still carrying the burden of an excessive real wage level from the seventies. A considerable part of current unemployment is due to the fact that labour has now become too expensive. . . . However, correcting false distribution relations needs time. A start has been made in most of the major industrial countries. The course must be held over the medium term if a growth process which does not bring with it a danger of inflation is to be set in motion and sustained. Because this view has gained widespread currency, and because I took Much of the work in this paper is based on a continuing project with Michael Bruno of Hebrew University, Jerusalem. This paper has benefited from our joint work, although the views expressed here are my own. Financial support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The real wage issue seems to invite extreme positions. In some models real wages are of no significance for macroeconomic outcomes, while in others they are of decisive importance. Not surprisingly, a middle position appears to be firmly supported by the data. High real wage levels are an important, though by no means exclusive, factor explaining the high levels of unemployment in OECD countries during much of the past decade. Real wages do not explain the sharp jump in unemployment since 1980 in most countries; that jump is clearly tied to monetary contraction rather than to supply factors. Real wages do, however, help explain the secular rise in unemployment since 1973. Furthermore, while high real wages complicate demand-management policies, they do not preclude them. Recall that Keynes saw demand expansion as a solution to high real wages; in some circumstances high demand can allow prices to rise relative to rigid nominal wages.
n.a. Not available. a. Actual labor share is total labor cost divided by nominal value added in manufacturing. The normalized share is described in the text. Value added is gross product at market prices in manufacturing for all countries except Canada and the United Kingdom, in which it is valued at factor cost.
Because (V/LI) is not observed, it must be estimated, and preferably in a straightforward and theory-free manner, so as not to prejudge some of the subsequent analysis. For this reason, I make the simple assumptions that (1) actual productivity equaled full-employment productivity in 1960, 1973, and 1979; (2) (VIL)f grew at a constant exponential rate during the 1960-73 and 1973-79 periods; and (3) the growth rate of (VIL)f during 1979-81 is a simple average of the observed rate and the 1973-79 rate.4 As discussed below, these calculations may overstate (VIL)f in the recent recession; if they do, the normalized labor share could be larger than calculated. 5. One of the points made below is that in the high-unemployment period of the 1970s, declining manufacturing employment involved the shutdown of least-efficient, laborintensive firms. Thus, fairly systematically across countries, sustained rises in unemployment actually raised measured productivity relative to trend, as low-efficiency firms were eliminated from the data. Since 1979 unemployment in Europe was well above 1973 levels, the observed productivity level in 1979 may be biased upward relative to (V/L)f. This effect appears strongest in Germany and France, and weakest in Japan, where lifetime employment policies in manufacturing preclude large-scale, rapid closing of inefficient plants. It is useful to ask why SfL is higher in 1981 than in 1978, given the low real wage growth during 1978-81. By the definition of labor share, one can write the percentage change in SfL as equal to real wage growth minus trend productivity growth, minus the change in consumer prices relative to manufacturing value-added prices. In countries in which real wage growth has slowed, it has been more than matched by a combination of productivity slowdown and shifts in the terms of trade against manufacturing-that is, shifts in PC relative to Pv. Formally, one can write ( 
1) ASfL = SL(W -PC) + SL(PC -PV) -SL(V -01,
where A signifies annual changes in level and lowercase variables indicate annual rates of change of their uppercase counterparts. The SL(PC -Pv) term captures changes from several sources: supply shocks, in which input prices change in real terms; changes in indirect tax rates; changes in exchange rates, which vary prices of nontraded goods relative to manufacturing tradables; and demand shifts away from or toward manufacturing. 81, is based on equation 1. The striking fact about the table is the important role played by Pc -Pv in the manufacturing profit squeeze since 1978, a much larger role than was seen during 1973-78. Part of this shift reflects the second oil shock. The especially large values in the United States and the United Kingdom reflect the added effects of the sharp appreciation of exchange rates, which have narrowed margins in tradable goods. In the United Kingdom there was also an important increase in indirect taxes. To these factors one may add another: a more general shift in demand away from manufacturing to other domestic sectors, which makes the profit squeeze in manufacturing a sectoral rather than economy-wide phenomenon. Because of data limitations on wages and productivity in other sectors, I have not examined this last factor closely. Finally, table 3 shows that a slowdown in productivity growth after 1978, reflected in falling absolute values of -SL(V -EY, also plays a significant role in accounting for ASfL. Table 4 presents estimates of a concept I call the wage-gap. I assume that the normalized labor share was at an appropriate level for full employment during 1965-69 and define the wage gap, Wg, in any year as the departure of the normalized share from that level, measured by log 
The Wage Gap as an Indicator of Aggregate Supply
The wage-gap concept can be judged by its usefulness for determining aggregate supply conditions, and on this basis even the very simple measure estimated here does well. Three examples are analyzed. First, Wg can track the pattern of unemployment in most OECD economies, particularly if additional demand-side variables are also utilized. Second, this variable can help to explain shifts in the Phillips curve in several economies. The idea here is that price changes are a function of aggregate demand, VD, relative to aggregate supply, Vs; a rise in Wg reduces Vs and makes inflation intensify for a given level of aggregate demand. Third, Wg helps to explain the decline in profitability in most of these economies even when cyclical variables are also added to the profit equations.
6. Up to a constant, the wage gap is defined as log [(WIP,)I(VIL)f], or log(WIPv) -log(VIL)f. Assuming aVIaL = WIPv, we see that WIPv is proportional to VIL. Thus, up to a constant, Wg = log(V/L) -log(VIL)f, which upon substitution of the production technology yields equation 2.
In all these applications, Wg is less powerful in the United States than in the other OECD economies, suggesting both that U.S. fluctuations have been largely demand-driven, and that U.S. supply conditions cannot be measured well by observed ratios of wages to productivity. But the results also point out the danger of generalizing U. S. econometric results. The widely recognized cyclical independence of real wages and unemployment in the United States simply does not hold as a general proposition for other economies. Table 5 presents regressions for the six OECD countries. In the first regression unemployment is regressed on its own lagged value, a time trend for productivity growth, a trend shift after 1974, and the logarithm of the lagged product wage:
(4) Ut = a0 + aO IUt + a2time + a3t197581 + a4 log (W/PV)t-I In the second regression the last two variables are replaced by the lagged wage gap: The results show a strong positive relation between the real wage, or wage gap, and unemployment in four of the six OECD economies; the relation is weak and statistically insignificant in France and the United States. The unemployment rate for Japan is a notoriously sluggish indication of cyclical conditions. It is used here and in subsequent tables to include Japan in the analysis on a consistent basis with the other countries studied. According to the point estimates, each increase of 1.0 percentage point in the product wage relative to trend raises the unemployment rate in the long run by 0.5 percentage point in Canada, 0.04 point in France, 0.4 point in Germany, 0.04 point in Japan, and 1.1 points in the United Kingdom. There are several reasons, however, not to take such point estimates too seriously, the main one being that the equations do not truly identify an aggregate labor-demand schedule, as shown below.
The results for estimates of equations 4 and 5 are a bit surprising in light of a long history of papers in which the real wage is shown to be acyclical or even procyclical. Keynes wrote in the General Theory that a real wage squeeze was necessary to explain the supply response of The most important problem with the Geary-Kennan analysis is that the wage is measured relative to the wholesale price index (WPI), rather than to P,. This procedure is treacherous in a period of supply shocks, which raise WPI relative to Pv. It appears that the real wage has decreased when measured as WIWPI, when in fact it has increased when measured as WlPv. Grubb, Layard, and Symons show that when employment is regressed on WIWPI in an equation that also includes a real price of intermediate inputs (which Geary and Kennan exclude), the expected negative relation between the real wage and employment is found. a. The dependent variable is the log ratio of gross operating surplus (profits plus capital-consumption adjustment plus income of self-employed persons) to replacement cost of total capital stock. The numbers in parentheses are tstatistics.
Implications of the Real Wage Gap for Demand Management
It is often incorrectly argued that "classical" unemployment due to a wage gap cannot be treated by Keynesian policies. But the real wage argument does not, in itself, provide a case against expansionary macroeconomic policies. As I noted at some length in my 1979 BPEA paper, demand expansion may be very helpful in fostering recovery, particularly if the demand policies themselves help to reduce the wage gap. Whether they do depends on how wages, prices, and productivity respond to the demand stimulus.
The Great Depression provides a vivid illustration of that proposition. An observer of the early years of the depression could have made a "profit squeeze" analysis of the sort made in the first half of this paper. Sheila Bonnell makes this point in a fascinating recent note in the Economic Record, from which I adapt some data in tables 8 and 9.
In 1934 the first half of this paper might have been written like this:
The major economies of the world have been subjected to a profit squeeze of remarkable proportions during 1929-33. In all major economies, the high productivity growth of the 1920s ended abruptly in 1929, and though Denison Thus it seems clear that recovery will only come when profit margins have been restored, which means that growth of real wages will have to be severely constrained in Europe for the next several years.
Robert J. Gordon, who might have been the discussant of this work, would have asked, for instance, for underlying trend productivity growth calculations for 1928-32 rather than the actual rates shown in the table. He might also have noted that the profit-squeeze hypothesis, while interesting, simply does not fit the data, pointing out that the United Kingdom, with a larger increase in the share of labor during 1928-32, had a lower unemployment rate than the United States and Sweden. Finally, James Tobin might have observed that none of this precludes faster money growth as a solution to the crisis.
The three main points of the hypothetical discussion-excess product wage growth, the difference of cyclical and trend productivity, and the usefulness of expansionary policy-are all correct in the context of 1934. Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom achieved a strong recovery by 1937, in each case led by reflationary policies. In Germany it was the combination of heavy rearmament and capital controls under the Nazi regime that restored demand. In the United Kingdom the 1931 devaluation was decisive in breaking the fall in prices, and eventually restoring demand and profits. In Sweden a combination of expansionary domestic policies and rising exports to Germany was responsible for the demandled recovery. In all these cases, given rigidities in nominal wages, the demand expansions reduced real wage growth and at the same time allowed a cyclical boost to productivity. The profit share in each case returned to the 1928 level, and with it, the unemployment rate. In the United States neither the profit share nor unemployment was restored to levels that existed before the depression until World War II. The difference between the 1930s and 1980s in the task facing demand management lies neither in the necessity of restoring profit margins nor in the need for moderation of real wages. The difference lies in the capacity of demand policies to bring about the needed rise in profits, particularly in ways that are compatible with inflation targets. There are three points here that form the basis for the remaining discussion on implications of the real wage gap.
First, part of the mechanism of demand policy is to engineer real wage moderation through higher inflation. While this was feasible in the 1930s, and perhaps is still today in the United States, it provides a dubious basis for policy in most European OECD economies. Demand management can still serve this role, but only if it is combined with an explicit understanding with the major wage negotiators that real wage moderation is required.
Second, in the 1930s there were tremendous productivity dividends to be reaped from an expansion. The case for such large dividends is more dubious today.
Third, the "room for maneuver" for policymakers is still somewhat limited. In the beginning of the depression, prices had declined significantly, so that inflationary policies were not only palatable, but desirable. In the United Kingdom there was little discussion about a 10 percent rise in the consumer price index during 1933-37 in view of the 15 percent fall in the previous five years. When the same policies start from a high level of inflation, they can be far less attractive.
Despite these caveats, the data do suggest the possibility of a noninflationary, demand-led recovery in Europe, if real wage growth can be sustained at current low levels through a period of demand expansion. This argument is presented below.
To judge the possible effectiveness of demand policies, one must place the wage gap in an overall macroeconomic framework. As a first step I focus on the interactions among wages, prices, and productivity to examine how a demand expansion would affect Wg. I then examine the room for maneuver with the assumption of an unchanged wage gap.
WAGE AND PRICE DETERMINATION
Econometric studies by a number of authors, including those by Gordon, by Branson and Rotemberg, and by me in my 1979 BPEA paper, indicate that nominal wage growth in Europe is so closely linked to consumer price developments that a demand expansion is likely to raise Wg rather than reduce it as in the 1930s. 14 The contrary seems to be true in the United States, and perhaps also in Canada. Before turning to some econometric evidence on this point, I present stylized versions of wageprice equations for the United States and the major European economies ("Europe" in this discussion). Thus in an economy with wages lagging prices, as in the United States, a demand expansion reduces the wage gap; productivity shocks and shocks to the terms of trade affect the real wage directly and do not get built into the wage gap. In economies with wages leading prices, as in Europe, a demand expansion (or, more precisely, a low level of U) increases the wage gap; productivity shocks and shocks to the terms of trade directly affect Wg but do not affect w -Pc for a given level of U. Wage and price equations are presented in tables 10 and 11 for the six economies to confirm the differences in behavior just discussed. Table  10 As expected, otl is estimated as close to 1.0 in the United States and Canada, and less than 1.0 in the other economies. The estimates are not 
Pv, = Oto + Otl(w -vf + ff), + a2Wg,-1 + a3U,1.
According to theory, X2 should be positive and (3 negative, since higher Wg raises excess demand and higher U lowers it. Once again, the direct effects of unit-labor costs on prices (measured by otl) are highest in the United States and Canada and are significantly less than 1.0 in all the other countries. It is probably true that equations 1 la and 1 lb caricature the differences between the United States and Europe, because changes in unit-labor costs are a determinant of price changes in both areas. However, the estimates support the hypothesis that wages feed rapidly into prices in the United States, and more slowly (via Wg) in Europe.
PRODUCTIVITY AND EXPANSION
The data for the 1930s in tables 8 and 9 show that recovery in Europe brought with it not only deceleration of real wages but also a significant increase in productivity growth that helped restore profitability. Should one now expect that an expansion would also yield a productivity dividend, perhaps one large enough to overcome a rise in w -pc? To some extent a dividend to the productivity level is allowed for because the wage gap is calculated for a cyclically adjusted value of VIL. According to the procedures used for calculating (VIL)f above, actual productivity in 1981 is judged to be 0.3 percent below potential in the United States; 3.2 percent below in France; 3.0 percent below in Germany; and-2.2 percent below in Japan. In the United Kingdom VIL is judged to be more than (VIL)f, for reasons described below.
Have the productivity gains that might follow a fall in U been underestimated? There are two questions here. First, have we underestimated (VIL)f for 1982, and thus overstated the current wage gap? And second, are there reasons to believe that, whatever the level of (VIL)f, future trend productivity growth, vf -Uf, would be higher in a high employment economy? Broadly speaking, the evidence suggests a negative answer for the first question, and a positive one for the second.
Two possible effects must be considered in correcting observed labor productivity for cyclical factors. On the one hand, a demand contraction may lower observed productivity relative to potential if firms carry extensive overhead labor in the downturn. This is the usual effect in U.S. data. On the other hand, if the contraction also involves a profit squeeze, so that the variable costs of the least efficient firms are not covered, the downturn may raise observed productivity. This is the effect predicted by simple production theory. 17 The low-efficiency, laborintensive firms simply drop out of the data. In contrast to the United States, this effect is predominant in European countries and has been widely noted by several authors. 18 Manufacturing productivity growth in the United Kingdom rose by 3.2 percent a year in 1979-81 during the steep downturn in manufacturing production. It is doubtful that the newly unemployed could be reemployed without a one-shot decline in average productivity on that account.
A measure of these alternative effects can be gleaned from a regression of average labor productivity in manufacturing on aggregate unemployment: In Europe but not in Japan the overall effect of a sustained rise in unemployment is to raise measured productivity relative to trend. Given the constraints on layoffs in Japan, the productivity effect starts off strongly negative and remains negative on balance after three years. These results suggest that the observed productivity levels in 1979 were probably above potential in the European economies because unemployment had been high there for several years. These levels are probably near or below potential now, given the rapid rise in unemployment recently, which most likely added redundant overhead labor.
Using the estimates of table 12 to measure (VIL)f, one can derive a new set of wage gaps based on adjusting observed productivity each year to full employment levels; and these can be compared with the wage gaps developed earlier that were based on trend-line estimates of full-employment productivity. The second possible effect of the cycle on productivity is the effect of slack on the productivity trend itself. Several writers have recently contended that slack has affected the trend growth rate, not through the short-run labor-hoarding phenomenon, but through deeper channels including lower capital accumulation, reduced mobility of labor among firms and sectors, and less learning by doing and exploitation of economies of scale. Dickens makes the interesting point that the productivity "lost" in U.S. downturns is not made up during the upturns. The longer is the cyclical downturn, according to this analysis, the lower is the peakto-peak rate of productivity growth.20 Similarly, peak-to-peak productivity growth during the Great Depression was generally far below that of the 1920s in European economies. These bits of evidence suggest that a return to higher employment might improve trend productivity growth from 1983 forward. In this case, the restoration of higher employment levels would make room for faster real wage growth in the future, but would do little currently to shift the share of profits in value added. Thus, unlike in the 1930s, a demand expansion alone is unlikely to reduce the wage gap quickly to zero. In Europe a demand expansion would probably raise Wg, thereby intensifying the cyclically adjusted profit squeeze. It does not follow that an expansion is therefore unable to lower unemployment or raise profits. Even though Wg is high, a demand expansion can still be fully effective. First, if VD < Vs, a demand expansion can raise output at least to the level of VS. Since tight monetary policies rather than a rise in Wg seem to explain the recent sharp rise in unemployment in Germany and the United States, there should be scope for expansion in these economies. Second, the previous discussion, particularly of the early 1970s, suggests that demand policies may be able to raise output even beyond Vs. Firms may be willing, at least for some time, to meet demand at prices below marginal cost (in other words, to produce at V > VS) in order to maintain market shares and customer relations. The evidence of the early 1970s does not seem to support the strict disequilibrium view that V = min(VD, Vs), though this assertion requires careful econometric scrutiny.
Before turning to an assessment of near-term policy alternatives, it is worthwhile summarizing the arguments that have been made on this point:
Real wages remain high relative to full-employment productivity in the manufacturing sectors of the major OECD economies. The wage gap has actually risen since 1979 in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The large wage gaps, together with the direct effects of extremely tight monetary policies, account for the high OECD unemployment rates. These monetary policies are also a factor in the large wage gaps, at least in the United Kingdom and United States.
Demand expansion and contraction can affect output independently of any effect on Wg. Specifically, expansionary demand policies can operate even without reducing the wage gap. This is especially true now in the United States and Germany, where the wage gap did not account for the sharp rise in unemployment after 1981.
A large wage gap shifts the Phillips curve upward. A given level of unemployment is more inflationary when Wg is high.
A large wage gap shifts the profit rate downward for each level of unemployment. On the other hand, given Wg, a reduction in unemploy-ment raises the rate of return. Thus an expansionary policy can probably raise profitability even if it does not lower Wg.
A demand expansion would probably raise real wage growth outside the United States, and is thus unlikely to meliorate the wage squeeze (except for the arguments made below).
There is probably no large, one-time productivity dividend waiting to be recaptured with a return to full employment. Because low-efficiency production units have been idled in the past several years, bringing current unused capacity back on line could even involve a one-time drop in average productivity. However, there is probably scope for raising productivity growth over the next several years through a demand expansion.
Policy Choices in the Near Term
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give detailed prospects for individual economies under various demand management policies. In this concluding section, I make three modest observations. First, in all the major OECD economies, unemployment is now so high that continued reduction in inflation will probably be achieved even without any reduction in Wg. In other words, unemployment can be reduced now without jeopardizing recent gains in fighting inflation, even if the cyclically adjusted rate of profit is not improved. Second, the fall in oil prices in the past year, which will reduce consumer prices relative to value added prices, should directly raise profitability in the manufacturing sectors of the major OECD economies, just as higher oil prices squeezed profitability in those sectors in 1973 and 1979. Third, there may now be a good opportunity for devising social contracts between governments and trade unions in several European economies under which faster demand expansion is offered in return for continued moderation of real wages.
High real wages should not now be a reason for continued contractionary policies, particularly in Germany. In all the major OECD economies, unemployment at the end of 1982 was so high that continued reductions in inflation are likely even without any reduction in Wg. To illustrate this proposition, the inflation rate projected from the equations in The assumption here that Wg will remain unchanged in 1983 may itself be too pessimistic, in which case the inflation projections in each cell for that year are too high. The recent 15 percent fall in the dollar price of petroleum alone should lead to a significant reduction in Wg and to a rise in profits. Assuming that the value share of energy inputs in total gross output in manufacturing is now about 10 percent, a 15 percent real reduction in energy input prices should raise Pv relative to PC by about 1.5 percent. If WIPc is unaffected by the fall in energy prices, WIPv would also fall by 1.5 percent. In this case, profits would rise approximately 4 to 5 percent (perhaps one-half to one percentage point) according to the estimates in table 7.
Even with this gain, a substantial profit squeeze will remain in Europe, the United States, and Japan. The U.S. situation is probably most easily cured: a reversal of the dollar appreciation of 1980-82 will go far toward reducing Wg because nominal wages are unlikely to respond strongly to such a depreciation.
In Europe the problem continues to be more difficult, though several institutional changes on the horizon are promising. After several years of bitter debate in Europe between advocates and opponents of con- A third problem with Wg lies in measurement errors in the valueadded components. In the aggregate national income accounts, the share of employee compensation in value added tends to rise secularly because an increasing proportion of the labor force shifts from self-employed to dependent status. Employee compensation covers dependent employment only. To account for this secular trend a correction is often made for aggregate data by imputing some of self-employed income to employee compensation. The problem is greatly attenuated for the manu facturing sector, in which dependent employment is usually a high and nearly constant proportion of the labor force and small-scale enterprise is often not counted in the measure of value added. Still, it would be useful to look more closely for this possible bias.
The final data problem involves the use of measures for the manufacturing sector to judge the wage-gap problem for an overall economy. This approach reflects nothing more than the problem of data availability, for only the manufacturing sector offers good cross-country measures of hours worked and hourly compensation. There are reasons to believe that wage gaps in other sectors would differ from those that I have calculated. A change in exchange rates, for example, can cause important relative price changes within a country between tradable and nontradable goods sectors, so that the same nominal wage developments across sectors can yield very different wage-gap measures. Also, the manufacturing sectors of most of these OECD economies are more highly unionized than other sectors, suggesting that nominal wage developments across sectors within a country might be different, and in particular, that the wage gap in manufacturing might be larger than in the rest of the economy.
Comments and Discussion
Robert J. Gordon: One of the most outstanding puzzles in macroeconomics is the enormous increase in unemployment that has taken place in Europe as compared to the United States. In contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s, when the average unemployment rate in major OECD countries (except Italy and Canada) was at roughly half the U.S. rate, by 1983 the unemployment rate in many European countries approached or exceeded that in the United States. In this paper Jeffrey Sachs addresses a central policy question of worldwide concern: can expansionary policy be relied upon to reduce the unemployment rate in Europe, or does the increase in unemployment in Europe have a structural interpretation? Those who support the second interpretation would predict that expansionary policy will be stymied by a steep or vertical aggregate supply curve that translates growth in nominal GNP directly into higher prices rather than higher output.
In In this paper the author's analysis focuses on a new variable called the wage gap, which is simply the actual real product wage divided by the trend in labor productivity. Two other ways of describing the wage gap are as trend unit-labor cost deflated by the value-added deflator, and, perhaps most usefully, as an index of the share of labor compensation in manufacturing value added, adjusted for cyclical movements in labor productivity. The paper consists of a demonstration that the wage gap matters greatly in comparative macroeconomics and offers an explanation of time-series and cross-country movements in unemployment, inflation, and profits. The paper's basic argument can be summarized in three points: (1) the large wage gaps, together with the direct effects of extremely tight monetary policies, account for the high OECD unemployment rates, which implies that a significant reduction in unemployment requires both a loosening of monetary policy and a reduction in the wage gap; (2) a large wage gap shifts the Phillips curve upward, which suggests that in countries with a large current wage gap, expansionary policy will produce more inflation than in previous periods with a lower wage gap; and (3) a demand expansion is unlikely to meliorate the wage squeeze, that is, lower the wage gap. The paper is ambitious, comprehensive, and stimulating, all the more so because its policy message is profoundly gloomy.
Part of my discussion is already anticipated in the paper by Sachs. In an imaginative and effective aside, Sachs pretends that he is writing in 1934 and shows that the available data at that time could have been misinterpreted as suggesting that the Great Depression was due to excessive real wage growth rather than insufficient aggregate demand. would have focused on the difference between cyclical and trend productivity and on the lack of cross-country correlation between changes in labor's share and changes in unemployment rates. Indeed, some of my attention below is directed to those issues.
Before I take up those points, however, it is useful to review the predictions of static macroeconomic theory for the connections between the wage gap, unemployment, and the business cycle. It is particularly appropriate that William Branson was involved in developing the hypothesis that real wage rigidity is at the heart of Europe's unemployment problem because his graduate textbook, written more than a decade ago, contains a complete analysis of the consequences of nominal and real wage rigidity in a classroom aggregate demand-supply model. Since Sachs's wage gap is the real product wage adjusted for the trend in productivity, the textbook analysis already contains numerous predictions for the behavior of the wage gap in an economy having a zero productivity trend. A review of those predictions follows.
First, the most obvious connection is cyclical. If the price level displays a greater amplitude of procyclical fluctuations than the nominal wage rate, then the real wage, and hence the wage gap, varies countercyclically. A negative correlation between the wage gap and output is thus predicted. If the labor supply curve is vertical and the quantity of labor employed is continuously determined along a downward sloping labor demand curve, then the wage gap is positively correlated with the unemployment rate. Note that this positive correlation occurs without any mention of supply shocks or wage push, nor any implication that the aggregate output supply curve is vertical.
Second, if there is an autonomous upward push on the nominal wage rate, the aggregate supply curve is shifted upward but remains positively sloped. Any temporary loss in output can be "inflated away" by the central bank. The resulting short-run positive correlation between the unemployment rate and wage gap does not imply that expansionary policy is impotent.
Third, if there is an autonomous upward push on real wages, the aggregate supply curve is rotated into a vertical position if workers are able to maintain the new higher real wage with implicit or explicit 100 percent cost-of-living-allowance (COLA) clauses. Now expansionary policy fails to raise output, and an increase in the rate of nominal GNP growth raises the inflation rate in proportion.
Fourth, if an oil shock or other adverse event reduces the level of the marginal product of labor while the real wage remains rigid, the aggregate supply curve also becomes vertical. If the real wage declines but not in full proportion to the drop in labor's marginal product, the aggregate supply curve becomes steeper but not vertical.
This brings me to my first reservation about the paper. To support his first major conclusion-that the wage gap helps to explain the secular rise in unemployment since 1973-Sachs points to the positive coefficient on the wage gap in equations explaining unemployment in his table 5 . Yet the textbook analysis shows that such a positive correlation has no implications at all for the slope of the aggregate supply curve, and hence for the division between inflation and output growth of an expansionary policy that accelerates nominal GNP growth. Further, the positive coefficients on the wage gap in his table 5 must mainly reflect cyclical influences, because the wage gap has no predictive power in explaining cross-country differences in the secular rise in unemployment since 1973. This seems obvious in my table 1 below, which contains data on the unemployment rate and wage gap for Sachs's six countries plus Italy, the missing member of Europe's "big four." Leaving aside for the moment the cyclical movement from 1979 to 1981, for Sachs' first conclusion to be validated, those countries experiencing the largest increases in unemployment between the cyclical peak years of 1973 and 1979 should also exhibit the largest increase in their wage gaps. Yet the largest absolute increases in unemployment occurred in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, in that order, whereas the largest increases in the wage gap occurred in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
To determine whether this visual impression is correct, I performed some simple correlation tests. The section of Sachs's paper that is most novel and interesting to me is the analysis supporting the final conclusion, that Europe differs from the United States not only in the character of its wage-adjustment process, but also in the nature of productivity fluctuations during the business cycle. In the United States one is accustomed to the idea that labor is hoarded in cyclical downturns, so that an expansion of aggregate demand brings with it growth in productivity that is above trend. In Europe, however, Sachs asserts that the overall effect of a sustained rise in unemployment is to raise measured productivity relative to trend. Sachs implies that a demand expansion that reduces unemployment will thus cause productivity growth to decline. By the data of table 1 above, this suggests that not just the 1981 trend measure of the wage gap understates the true gap, but even the 1981 actual may imply an understatement. If productivity growth were to decline further below the 1973-79 trend than what already occurred in 1979-81, and if real wage growth occurs at anything like the recent rates in Europe, the implied wage gaps for a future year like 1985 would be enormous.
Sachs provides table 12 to support the proposition that cyclical productivity behavior differs in Europe compared to the United States. His table shows that, except for Japan, a sustained increase in unemployment raises the level of manufacturing productivity, in the sense that the sum of coefficients on current and lagged unemployment is positive in every country but Japan. There are two problems with the specification that Sachs uses in table 12. First, the dependent variable refers to the manufacturing sector while the right-hand variables for unemployment refer to the entire economy (this is also a problem in tables 5 and 6). Second, there is a secular trend in the unemployment rate series for several countries that may be accounted for by factors other than the wage gap, for example, a demographic shift in the United A final overall comment on the Sachs paper is that it exaggerates differences in behavior between Europe and the United States. While a detailed evaluation of the wage and price regressions is beyond the scope of these comments, other work done by myself and my student George Kahn indicates that differences in wage and price behavior among Sachs's six countries are a matter of degree, not a matter of kind.6 A dilemma posed by this type of comparative macroeconomic research is that unusual behavior seems to occur in individual countries rather than a pattern common to a whole set of countries. For instance, in my table 1, Japan is peculiar because of the huge increase in its wage gap without any marked increase in unemployment, while France at the opposite extreme has suffered the greatest increase in unemployment with no important changes in its wage gap. Similarly, Germany seems to be an outlier in the countercyclical nature of its productivity response. The anomalies would multiply if other countries experiencing relatively low increases in unemployment (Austria and Sweden, for instance) were added to the sample. These doubts about the general applicability of the relations developed in the Sachs paper suggest that many fascinating empirical puzzles await resolution by those who are concerned with these central problems in comparative macroeconomics. My table 5 presents evidence that changes in the wage gap in several countries help to track unemployment in the past two decades. Gordon does not question this evidence, but points out that "such a positive correlation has no implications at all for the slope of the aggregate supply curve," which is of course true, but not germane to the issue of table 5. The point there is to suggest that real wage moderation is necessary; Gordon's point is that demand expansion may bring it about. This is also the point of my example of the Great Depression. I Gordon's challenge to the argument that real wages are too high rests on cross-country evidence. He compares for seven countries the change in unemployment between 1973 and 1979 (and 1981) with a change in his wage-gap measure for the same period, and finds little cross-country 1. Gordon misconstrues this example by saying that I include it to show that available data at that time could have been misinterpreted to suggest that the Great Depression was due to excessive real wage growth rather than to insufficient aggregate demand. Gordon sets up a false dichotomy here. Both the wage and demand factors were present. Demand deflation raised real wages, and moderation of real wages was necessary for recovery. The moderation was brought about by demand expansion. and France, where the effect will be small, and in Japan, where the effect is significant. And as Gordon's results also show, these gains are in any event too small to eliminate the wage gap that we have both calculated.
General Discussion
James Duesenberry pointed out that one important implication of the Sachs's paper was the existence of a very strong feedback effect of price changes on wages. Workers appear to be intransigent in their demands for real wage growth, so the effect of price inflation is to raise nominal wages immediately. Duesenberry urged Sachs to explain this result in terms of some simple model of price setting and wage determination.
Laurence Weiss stressed that such a model would have to distinguish between centralized European and decentralized U.S. wage bargaining institutions. Given the institutional framework, he wondered what goals should be attributed to European workers and firms and what theoretical model could explain the apparent responsiveness of output to expansionary demand policy in the absence of movements on real wages. Sachs responded that unions until recently had been attempting to secure constantly growing real wages. This is naturally increasingly hard to accomplish when unemployment rises sharply, as unions have come to recognize. The price-setting behavior of firms appears to be determined within a very long-term framework, with customer relations of paramount importance. In the short run, demand expansion can increase production and alter marginal costs without affecting real wages.
Martin Neil Baily argued that it was implausible to believe in the existence of structurally different wage determination and business cycle models for the United States and Europe. The fact that the equations Sachs estimated showed fundamentally different coefficients for the different economies raised doubts about the reliability of the equations. Sachs responded that, as Weiss had noted, the degree of unionization and the synchronization of bargaining in Europe were quite different from those in the United States. This leads to a difference in timing of many business-cycle phenomena, but not necessarily to a difference in underlying forces governing the economies. There is, for example, a faster passing-through of price changes into wages in Europe but not a fundamental difference in long-run behavior. Nonetheless, these timing differences are important for short-term policymaking, and they have caused different economies to respond differently to similar shocks. In several European economies, and in particular in the United Kingdom, real wages are considerably above their full-employment level. Baily also was skeptical that the productivity response to cyclical unemployment could differ across countries as much as estimates by Sachs implied.
Duesenberry argued that the paper should have dealt more thoroughly with the role of international trade in wage determination. Several of the countries considered have very open economies so that the terms of trade could be expected to have important effects on real wage rates. C. Fred Bergsten pointed out a clear correlation between jumps in the wage gap and fluctuations in a country's exchange rate. For example, a major jump in the gap occurred in 1978 for Germany and Japan, two countries whose currencies were overvalued in that year. Similarly, from 1978 to 1982 big jumps occurred in the wage gap in the United Kingdom, the United States, and to some extent France, countries whose currencies became overvalued in that period.
William Fellner commented on the relation between Keynes's policy prescriptions and those of Minister of Economics Otto Lambsdorff for Germany. At the time Keynes wrote the General Theory he saw no contradiction between his conclusion that the real wage was too high and his call for expansionary policies. During the previous years there had been steep deflation of prices, and expansionist policies were not likely to cause inflationary instability. Today, Lambsdorff's views are shaped by the fact that prices have been rising in recent years so that expansionist policies could cause sharp inflationary pressures.
